The tacit knowledge sharing in the scientific research team of universities has important implications for the building and innovation of the research team. Under conditions of bounded rationality, this paper establishes the evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing in the scientific research team of universities. By solving the replicator dynamics function,this paper is to judge the mechanism and path of the dynamic evolution of the knowledge-sharing in the scientific research team and to analyze the influencing factors of tacit knowledge sharing in university research team from the sharer, the recipient and the objective factors. According to the results, this paper develops effective strategies to promote knowledge sharing in the scientific team of universities.
| Published in | Science Innovation (Volume 2, Issue 6) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.si.20140206.11 |
| Page(s) | 77-81 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2015. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Scientific Research Team of University,Tacit Knowledge Sharing Activities,Bounded Rationality,Evolutionary Game
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APA Style
Su Xikun, He Lirong. (2015). The Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Tacit Knowledge Sharing Activities in the Scientific Research Team of Universities under the Bounded Rationality. Science Innovation, 2(6), 77-81. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20140206.11
ACS Style
Su Xikun; He Lirong. The Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Tacit Knowledge Sharing Activities in the Scientific Research Team of Universities under the Bounded Rationality. Sci. Innov. 2015, 2(6), 77-81. doi: 10.11648/j.si.20140206.11
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Download@article{10.11648/j.si.20140206.11,
author = {Su Xikun and He Lirong},
title = {The Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Tacit Knowledge Sharing Activities in the Scientific Research Team of Universities under the Bounded Rationality},
journal = {Science Innovation},
volume = {2},
number = {6},
pages = {77-81},
doi = {10.11648/j.si.20140206.11},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20140206.11},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.si.20140206.11},
abstract = {The tacit knowledge sharing in the scientific research team of universities has important implications for the building and innovation of the research team. Under conditions of bounded rationality, this paper establishes the evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing in the scientific research team of universities. By solving the replicator dynamics function,this paper is to judge the mechanism and path of the dynamic evolution of the knowledge-sharing in the scientific research team and to analyze the influencing factors of tacit knowledge sharing in university research team from the sharer, the recipient and the objective factors. According to the results, this paper develops effective strategies to promote knowledge sharing in the scientific team of universities.},
year = {2015}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - The Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Tacit Knowledge Sharing Activities in the Scientific Research Team of Universities under the Bounded Rationality AU - Su Xikun AU - He Lirong Y1 - 2015/01/19 PY - 2015 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20140206.11 DO - 10.11648/j.si.20140206.11 T2 - Science Innovation JF - Science Innovation JO - Science Innovation SP - 77 EP - 81 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2328-787X UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20140206.11 AB - The tacit knowledge sharing in the scientific research team of universities has important implications for the building and innovation of the research team. Under conditions of bounded rationality, this paper establishes the evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing in the scientific research team of universities. By solving the replicator dynamics function,this paper is to judge the mechanism and path of the dynamic evolution of the knowledge-sharing in the scientific research team and to analyze the influencing factors of tacit knowledge sharing in university research team from the sharer, the recipient and the objective factors. According to the results, this paper develops effective strategies to promote knowledge sharing in the scientific team of universities. VL - 2 IS - 6 ER -
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