Toward the goal of delineating the underlying decision-making process in relation to fairness, a mathematical model describing the decision criteria is derived. In this fairness-decision model, the decision-making criteria are limited to choose between fairness, equity/disparity and monetary gain. In this model, the decision threshold criteria are represented by the graphical location of the decision space in the fairness-equity quadrant. The fairness decision criterion is determined by the relativistic fairness stimulus-response function representing the relationship between fairness and disparity. The disparity/equity decision criterion is determined by the disparity of the monetary offer. The decision threshold is represented by the graphical intersection between the fairness stimulus-response function and the disparity function. The analysis shows that monetary gain or loss is a consequence of the decision, rather than a decision criterion, unless the decision is already predetermined. The analysis also shows that the paradoxical decisions that seem to be irrational (such as rejecting hyper-equitable offers) are, in fact, logically consistent without being paradoxical or irrational. It is resulted from a bias in fairness perception that shifts the fairness stimulus-response function up/down or left/right around the four fairness-equity quadrants. If either fairness or equity/disparity were used as the sole criterion for decision, no paradox would exist. It is only when both fairness and equity/disparity were used as the decision criteria simultaneously that would have resulted in a paradoxical decision under certain circumstances. But such paradox is merely a shift/bias in the fairness perception without being irrational, as predicted by the present relativistic fairness-equity model.
| Published in |
Psychology and Behavioral Sciences (Volume 3, Issue 6-1)
This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Neuroscience |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.pbs.s.2014030601.12 |
| Page(s) | 8-15 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2015. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Decision-Making, Fairness Bias, Equity, Rational Decision, Monetary Gain, Ultimatum Game
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APA Style
Nicoladie D. Tam. (2015). A Decision-Making Phase-Space Model for Fairness Assessment. Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, 3(6-1), 8-15. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pbs.s.2014030601.12
ACS Style
Nicoladie D. Tam. A Decision-Making Phase-Space Model for Fairness Assessment. Psychol. Behav. Sci. 2015, 3(6-1), 8-15. doi: 10.11648/j.pbs.s.2014030601.12
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Download@article{10.11648/j.pbs.s.2014030601.12,
author = {Nicoladie D. Tam},
title = {A Decision-Making Phase-Space Model for Fairness Assessment},
journal = {Psychology and Behavioral Sciences},
volume = {3},
number = {6-1},
pages = {8-15},
doi = {10.11648/j.pbs.s.2014030601.12},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pbs.s.2014030601.12},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.pbs.s.2014030601.12},
abstract = {Toward the goal of delineating the underlying decision-making process in relation to fairness, a mathematical model describing the decision criteria is derived. In this fairness-decision model, the decision-making criteria are limited to choose between fairness, equity/disparity and monetary gain. In this model, the decision threshold criteria are represented by the graphical location of the decision space in the fairness-equity quadrant. The fairness decision criterion is determined by the relativistic fairness stimulus-response function representing the relationship between fairness and disparity. The disparity/equity decision criterion is determined by the disparity of the monetary offer. The decision threshold is represented by the graphical intersection between the fairness stimulus-response function and the disparity function. The analysis shows that monetary gain or loss is a consequence of the decision, rather than a decision criterion, unless the decision is already predetermined. The analysis also shows that the paradoxical decisions that seem to be irrational (such as rejecting hyper-equitable offers) are, in fact, logically consistent without being paradoxical or irrational. It is resulted from a bias in fairness perception that shifts the fairness stimulus-response function up/down or left/right around the four fairness-equity quadrants. If either fairness or equity/disparity were used as the sole criterion for decision, no paradox would exist. It is only when both fairness and equity/disparity were used as the decision criteria simultaneously that would have resulted in a paradoxical decision under certain circumstances. But such paradox is merely a shift/bias in the fairness perception without being irrational, as predicted by the present relativistic fairness-equity model.},
year = {2015}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - A Decision-Making Phase-Space Model for Fairness Assessment AU - Nicoladie D. Tam Y1 - 2015/03/07 PY - 2015 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pbs.s.2014030601.12 DO - 10.11648/j.pbs.s.2014030601.12 T2 - Psychology and Behavioral Sciences JF - Psychology and Behavioral Sciences JO - Psychology and Behavioral Sciences SP - 8 EP - 15 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2328-7845 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pbs.s.2014030601.12 AB - Toward the goal of delineating the underlying decision-making process in relation to fairness, a mathematical model describing the decision criteria is derived. In this fairness-decision model, the decision-making criteria are limited to choose between fairness, equity/disparity and monetary gain. In this model, the decision threshold criteria are represented by the graphical location of the decision space in the fairness-equity quadrant. The fairness decision criterion is determined by the relativistic fairness stimulus-response function representing the relationship between fairness and disparity. The disparity/equity decision criterion is determined by the disparity of the monetary offer. The decision threshold is represented by the graphical intersection between the fairness stimulus-response function and the disparity function. The analysis shows that monetary gain or loss is a consequence of the decision, rather than a decision criterion, unless the decision is already predetermined. The analysis also shows that the paradoxical decisions that seem to be irrational (such as rejecting hyper-equitable offers) are, in fact, logically consistent without being paradoxical or irrational. It is resulted from a bias in fairness perception that shifts the fairness stimulus-response function up/down or left/right around the four fairness-equity quadrants. If either fairness or equity/disparity were used as the sole criterion for decision, no paradox would exist. It is only when both fairness and equity/disparity were used as the decision criteria simultaneously that would have resulted in a paradoxical decision under certain circumstances. But such paradox is merely a shift/bias in the fairness perception without being irrational, as predicted by the present relativistic fairness-equity model. VL - 3 IS - 6-1 ER -
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